The trial court granted both of Butler’s motions to dismiss with prejudice and awarded Butler $34,998.27 in attorneys’ fees she incurred in connection with the Act but refused to award her the $4,306.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with her motion based upon the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Hytel appealed.
In a lengthy, well reasoned opinion, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision and award of fees. In doing so, the Illinois Appellate Court noted the Act provides:
Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of government, it is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government must be encouraged and safeguarded with great diligence. The information, reports, opinions, claims, arguments, and other expressions provided by citizens are vital to effective law enforcement, the operation of government, the making of public policy and decisions, and the continuation of representative democracy. The laws, courts, and other agencies of this State must provide the utmost protection for the free exercise of these rights of petition, speech, association, and government participation. Civil actions for money damages have been filed against citizens and organizations of this State as a result of their valid exercise of their constitutional rights to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in and communicate with government. There has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits termed 'Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation' in government or 'SLAPPs' as they are popularly called. The threat of SLAPPs significantly chills and diminishes citizen participation in government, voluntary public service, and the exercise of these important constitutional rights. This abuse of the judicial process can and has been used as a means of intimidating, harassing, or punishing citizens and organizations for involving themselves in public affairs. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008).
In holding that Hytel’s claims were barred by the Act, the trial and Appellate Courts both were of the opinion Hytel failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence at the motion stage of the proceedings that Butler's acts were not immunized from liability by the Act. Butler’s act of seeking her unpaid wages through the Illinois Department of Labor constituted a proper act of a citizen seeking redress of grievances. Therefore, unless Hytel could prove its claims against Butler were meritorious and were not merely brought to silence Butler as a citizen through its threats of millions in damages and litigation expenses, it could not proceed on its claims. Moreover, having failed to meet its burden of proof, Hytel was properly ordered to pay Butler the attorneys’ fees she incurred in connection with the dismissal of its suit under the Act.
Similarly, one day after the Illinois Appellate Court ruled in Butler’s favor, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its opinion in favor of another citizen, John Walsh, who made allegedly defamatory comments concerning a condominium developer during a community discussion held at the local alderman’s office. When Walsh and a local newspaper were sued by the developer for defamation arising out of comments made by Walsh at the alderman’s office and reported by the newspaper, Walsh moved to dismiss under the Act. He asserted the developer’s lawsuit constituted a SLAPP suit and that he was immune from liability for his comments made during the meeting with the alderman. The trial court denied Walsh’s motion under the Act and refused to award him attorneys’ fees but it granted his motion to dismiss under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal and agreed he was not entitled to relief under the Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and found Walsh’s statements were clearly immunized by the Act and the developer should have been ordered to pay Walsh’s attorneys’ fees and cost. The Court reasoned those who attempt to chill a citizen’s exercise of his constitutional rights by use of meritless and retaliatory lawsuits should be ordered to pay the citizen’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with the dismissal of such suits as mandated by the Act.
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